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ScienceDirect1 For a detailed account of the 2012 Act see: Nicholas Timmins, Never Again?: The Story of the Health andContemporary policy debates construct public involve-
ment in England’s National Health Service as ‘‘new,’’ or
as a practice dating back only as far as the 1990s. This
article argues that the longer historical contexts of such
consultative practice matter, and it explores various and
shifting manifestations of ‘‘consultation’’ in the NHS
from the foundation of the Service in 1948. In doing
so, it first demonstrates that consultation has always
been a part of the theory and practice of postwar health
policy. Thinking about consultation as ‘‘new’’ presents
such practice as unnecessary or transient, and may
function as part of a damaging political vision of public
affection for the NHS as a barrier to reform. Second, the
article asserts that public interest in shaping NHS prac-
tice and policy has never been fully satisfied by official
consultative mechanisms. ‘‘The public’’ is not a homo-
geneous group, but rather composed of various groups,
communities, and individuals with rich perspectives and
histories to share, having experienced the NHS as
patients, friends, supporters, staff, and volunteers. Poli-
cy-makers should approach diverse publics as partners,
and should meaningfully listen to protests around NHS
reform, which often reflect public investment in the NHS,
as well as valid concerns about how particular commu-
nities will be able to access health care. While the politi-
cal will for such engagement has varied over time,
individual politicians and local-level health agencies
can make a difference by supporting, engaging with,
and funding organizations which represent and empow-
er a diverse range of communities: such groups have
always, and will continue to play, a significant role in
shaping NHS debate and care.
“Whose NHS?,” “Our NHS!”
Chant during 250,000-strong march in defense of
“Our NHS,” London, March 4, 2017
“One of the great strengths of this country is that we
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with communities and citizens in new ways, involv-
ing them directly in decisions about the future of
health and care services.”
NHS England, The Five Year Forward View, 2014
Tens of thousands of people ﬂooded into Parliament
Square in London in March 2017, enraged by cuts, clo-
sures, and private provision in the UK’s National Health
Service. Convinced that their voices had not been heard in
discussions over reforms to “our NHS,” (Figures 1 and 2)
the protesters displayed their level of commitment to the
service. They had reasonable grounds to do so. The Five
Year Forward View, a 2014 strategy document published
by NHS England, stated that the National Health Service
belongs to “the people,” and articulated the importance of
engaging with “communities and citizens” during health
policy planning. The march nevertheless indicates that
broad swathes of the public feel that their interests are not
being represented during health reform, notably following
a large-scale reorganization of the service in the
2012 Health and Social Care Act and as, the following
year, NHS England stated that even if government spend-
ing on the service continued in line with inﬂation, it would
still face a funding gap of £30 billion by 2020–2021.1
Despite public “involvement,” “consultation,” or “listen-
ing” exercises, then, a signiﬁcant proportion of the popu-
lation still feels the need to defend the service, most
recently against major changes to NHS ﬁnancing and
provision advocated by Conservative Prime Minister
Theresa May and her predecessor, David Cameron. Con-
cerns about NHS funding are no minority position: in a
recent sample, two-thirds of the population told pollsters
that they would like to contribute further tax for the
NHS.2 The evident failure of policy to meet these public
expectations raises questions about what policymakers
have wanted and expected from consultation exercises,
and the limits of consultative practices—which aspects of
NHS policy and practice have, and which have not, been upSocial Care Act 2012 (London: The Institute for Government and the King’s Fund, 2012).
2 Harry Evans and Dan Wellings, “What Does the Public Think about the NHS?,” The King’s Fund,
September 16, 2017, https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/what-does-public-think-about-nhs.
pen access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Figure 1. By Gwydion M. Williams from Coventry, Great Britain (2017_03_040044d)
[CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia
Commons.
Figure 2. By Gwydion M. Williams from Coventry, Great Britain (2017_03_040052)
[CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia
Commons.
3 George Gosling, Payment and Philanthropy in British Healthcare, 1918–48 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2017).
4 Ben Jackson, “Why Was the Beveridge Report So Popular?,” University of Oxford podcasts, June 22, 2015,
https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/why-was-beveridge-report-so-popular.
10 Endeavour Vol. 42 No. 1for public debate, and why? When is public opinion inﬂu-
ential, and when is it ignored? In this context, to what
extent do members of the public trust consultation exer-
cises, and how does this reﬂect broader senses of trust or
distrust in government oversight?
Looking to history can help us think through these
questions, seeing how they have been formed and how
different Governments and public groups have responded.
The complex interface between publics and policy in this
area has developed since the NHS was founded in 1948 by
a postwar Labour government. Despite growing public and
political interest in “consultation” through the late twen-
tieth century, the term has meant very different things to
different groups. Political consultative exercises have
sometimes been tokenistic, and have not always captured
the depth, signiﬁcance, and richness of public feelings
about the NHS. Consultative exercises have at times been
hindered by political visions of publics as a barrier to NHS
reform, rather than as a partner in promoting health.
Looking historically suggests that an array of voluntary
organizations have played a key role in driving and en-
abling public involvement in NHS planning and practice,
often by operating outside of “ofﬁcial” consultative mech-
anisms. At the inception of the NHS itself, medical inter-
ests, organized through trade and labor unions, were
signiﬁcant. From the 1970s, new mediatory bodies
emerged to unite, and speak on behalf of, particular public
constituencies: Community Health Councils organized
geographical communities; patient advocacy groups repre-
sented individuals concerned about particular medical
conditions; and new voluntary political groups repre-
sented those opposed to, or supportive of, local and nation-
al reforms. Effective organizations have represented
vulnerable populations, and enabled a broad range of
individuals to share their experiences of NHS care public-
ly, despite ﬁnancial, temporal, and emotional barriers to
individual-level political action. NHS policy would best
represent publics by consulting with and empowering awww.sciencedirect.combroad variety of such mediatory groups, and by supporting
new such groups to ﬂourish to represent a diverse range of
communities. Although the political will for this endeavor
is not always present, such groups have nonetheless had
signiﬁcant successes in shaping and contesting local and
national reforms since the inception of the NHS.
‘‘Those concerned . . . shall be fully consulted’’: What
Was Public Consultation?
Consulting Consultants? The Early NHS
Building on early twentieth century research from liberal
and social progressives, and on local experiments and
insurance schemes, political discussions about creating
a nationalized health service in the UK developed in
earnest during World War II.3 The report Social Insurance
and Allied Services (1942) proposed the implementation of
a new, universal health care system to sit alongside new
systems of family allowances, national insurance, pen-
sions, and unemployment beneﬁts. The report was
commissioned by government and written by a temporary
wartime civil servant, William Beveridge. Contrary to
expectations for such a bureaucratic document, over
600,000 copies were sold by February 1944. What became
known as the “Beveridge Report” was widely discussed on
radio, in press and, social surveyors found, across British
society.4 The popular appeal of this report demonstrated
the strong public appetite for such a service to the political
parties.
Even though public interest was visible in this way,
accessing and mediating the interests of medical profes-
sionals, rather than those of the public, was the priority of
early debates around the NHS. In 1944 the Ministry of
Health, led by Conservative Henry Willink, published the
white paper, A National Health Service. The paper prom-
ised that “those concerned, professionally and otherwise,
shall be fully consulted before ﬁnal decisions are taken.”
The document emphasized that the Government would
Endeavour Vol. 42 No. 1 11welcome “constructive criticism” and “public discussion,”
but also expressed hopes that these would “enable them to
submit quickly to Parliament legislative proposals which
will be largely agreed.” The document’s focus on getting
feedback from “professionals” rather than those catego-
rized as “otherwise” was clear. It emphasized that the
Government had already had discussions with local au-
thorities, the medical profession, and voluntary hospitals,
which were “considering the form which the new National
Health Service should take.”5
The new Labour government, elected in July 1945, set
Willink’s speciﬁc plans aside. Labour’s Minister of Health,
Aneurin Bevan, believed that central government should
play a much more signiﬁcant role in the new service than
had previously been conceptualized, and also that all
hospitals must be brought under public ownership. Bevan
circulated new plans in January 1946 to organizations
including the British Hospitals Association and the Brit-
ish Medical Association. Geoffrey Rivett argues that these
plans were shared, “not so much for the purpose of consul-
tation, but to prepare people for what was to come,” but
Bevan nonetheless encountered opposition from these
groups.6 The British Hospitals Association questioned
whether these plans would weaken connections between
local publics and their hospitals.7 The British Medical
Association initially proved strong critics, arguing that
doctors should hold independent status, rather than being
state employees on ﬁxed salaries.8
Following the publication of the National Health Ser-
vice Bill in March 1946, however, other professional bodies
expressed support for the new service. This was the posi-
tion of the Socialist Medical Association (SMA), a cam-
paign group afﬁliated with the Labour Party and open to
membership to all health professionals. The SMA had,
since its inception in 1930, called for a socialized medical
service, and in 1946 argued that the NHS would be an
“inﬁnitely better health service than the present worn-out
patchwork.”9 The Medical Practitioners Union, likewise,
and having challenged Willink’s 1944 model of the NHS,
circulated a letter to its members in January 1948 arguing
that with the “co-operation of the profession in operating
and perfecting it, the National Health Service Act can
bring inestimable beneﬁt to the profession and to the
community.”10 Thus, although successive Ministries of
Health expressed levels of interest in soliciting input
about the new NHS, professional groups and organiza-
tions were the key focus of external consultation. External5 Ministry of Health, A National Health Service: The White Paper Proposals in Brief (London: Her Majesty’s
Stationary Ofﬁce, 1944), 3.
6 Geoffrey Rivett, “Bevan and the NHS, 1945–1948,” NHS History Net, http://www.nhshistory.net/bevan.
htm.
7 Rivett, “Bevan and the NHS” (Ref. 6).
8 Jack Saunders, “The British Medical Association,” People’s History of the NHS, http://peopleshistorynhs.
org/encyclopaedia/the-british-medical-association/.
9 Socialist Medical Association, “Your New Health Service,” 1946, 2, Modern Records Centre, Coventry
(hereafter MRC), 126/TG/377/1/1/34.
10 The opposition of the Medical Practitioners Union in 1944 was based on criticism that the Service:
excluded industrial health and school children; failed to make the Ministry of Health dedicate its time,
speciﬁcally, to health (in addition to local government work); and promoted the treatment of disease, rather
than promotion of good health. (“Mr Willink’s Lost Opportunity,” Medical Practitioners Union, April 1944,
https://www.sochealth.co.uk/ national-health-service/ the-sma-and-the-foundation- of-the-national-health-
service-dr-leslie-hilliard-1980/ mr-willinks-lost-opportunity -mpu-april-1944/.) For the 1948 circular by the
MPU, see L. W. Hefferman, “National Health Service: You Must Decide,” circular, January 1948, 1, Trade
Union Congress, Medical Practitioners Union, MRC, 292/847/5/126.
www.sciencedirect.comconsultation continued while Ministers also sought con-
sensus from their political colleagues in Cabinet and
opposition, as well as in local government.
This is not to say that public voices were absent from
the formation of the NHS. Certain members of the public,
particularly from the middle and upper-classes, directly
sat on Regional Boards and hospital management com-
mittees. A public guide to the new NHS emphasized that
these people were more broadly, “non-professional men
and women who are interested in the hospitals and in the
good of their own communities,” and also highlighted the
key role of volunteers in contributing to hospital life.11
Assumptions about public belief also inﬂuenced political
thinking: indeed, the Medical Practitioners Union told its
membership in 1948 that the introduction of an NHS was
inevitable, not only because “the profession recognises its
need” but also given that “the people welcome it” and “no
political party dare support its postponement.”12
Again suggesting the import of public opinion during
early discussions about the NHS, the BMA also sought to
ally popular thinking to their cause. The organization’s
secretary, Charles Hill, wrote to the Daily Mail in August
1945 to couch his arguments in terms of public account-
ability, stating, “Doctors want to be employed by their
patients, to be responsible to their patients and to them
only.”13 In March 1946, he wrote again outlining his
critique of Bevan’s plan, and urging readers: “See to it
that you have your say. See to it that your voice is heard.”14
Signiﬁcantly, then, from the inception of the NHS, public
voices were heard in a variety of ways, and medical
representatives sought to understand, respond to, and
shape public feelings. At times, however, policymakers
and practitioners tended to imagine public preferences,
rather than gleaning them directly.
Of course, not all of the public wanted to be actively
involved in shaping new services. Social investigators at
the inception of the NHS found people in East London
taking a “perverse pride” in their disinterest in welfare
reform, while the majority of those interviewed in Man-
chester “just did not know.”15 Media coverage reﬂected
this lack of public concern, providing little newspaper
coverage in the ﬁrst days of the NHS’s operation.16 Fol-
lowing a brutal war, many members of the public were
focused on reconstructing their lives. Others still were
happy to accept the new service without calling for change,
given that it replaced a system in which women and
children in particular did not have easy access to health
care. At the same time, the lack of direct public involve-
ment in this period also reﬂected the ways in which
consultation was dominated by the most organized inter-
ests, and in which public groups were not being speciﬁcally
established in order to lobby for and shape the new service.
At times, organized medical interests reﬂected and over-11 Ministry of Health, The National Health Service (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Ofﬁce, 1948), 14,
MRC, 21/1489.
12 Hefferman, “National Health Service” (Ref. 10).
13 Charles Hill, “Your Doctor—and You,” Daily Mail, August 29, 1945, 2.
14 Charles Hill, “50,000 Doctors Say, ‘The Plan Won’t Work,’” Daily Mail, March 22, 1946, 2.
15 Nick Hayes, “Did We Really Want a National Health Service?: Hospitals, Patients and Public Opinions
before 1948,” English Historical Review 127, no. 526 (2012), 625–61, on 639.
16 Roberta Bivins, “The Appointed Day: Celebrated or Silent?,” People’s History of the NHS, https://
peopleshistorynhs.org/the-appointed-day-celebrated-or-silent/.
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consultative fora or mediatory bodies, few members of the
public themselves could directly contribute to debate.
Consulting Consumers
An expectation that NHS reform should involve wide-
spread and direct public consultation emerged in the
1960s and 1970s. Created while local government and
social services were also being reformed, the NHS Reor-
ganization Act of 1973 marked the ﬁrst signiﬁcant restruc-
turing of the NHS.17 The act reformed the tripartite
structure created in 1948, whereby primary care, second-
ary care, and local public health services were managed
separately. Hoping to improve coordination and efﬁciency
across health services, the act created a new administra-
tive system whereby health services were administered
through geographically based authorities (divided by “re-
gion” and then, further still, by “area”).
Public concern about this reform was relatively mini-
mal, and the BBC were reluctant to discuss the act on
radio or television, suggesting that, “the public will not be
interested.”18 However, the act itself created a new mech-
anism through which invested publics could seek to shape
health care provision in the future: establishing local-level
Community Health Councils (CHCs), covering popula-
tions from 86,000 to 530,000 people.19 CHCs were to be
funded by the Regional Health Authorities, who paid for
full-time staff (most had two), ofﬁce space, and expenses.20
CHCs had around twenty to thirty board members, who
were appointed for four years and could serve a maximum
of two terms. Of this membership, half were appointed by
local authorities—primarily councilors from the political
parties—one-third were chosen by eligible voluntary or-
ganizations, and the remaining one-sixth were selected by
the Regional Health Authority.21
Although the act stated that CHCs would “represent
the interests in the health service of the public in its
district,” it did not deﬁne precisely how they would under-
take such work in practice.22 Accordingly, how CHCs
operated varied across areas, shaped by perceptions of
local needs and the character and preferences of their
board members. Many focused on understanding local
views about health services and identifying gaps. Another
more confrontational form of action taken by CHCs sprung
from their legal right to be consulted about hospital clo-
sures, and involved escalating opposition to closures to the
courts.23 In 1979, for example, health service commis-
sioners suspended in-patient services in St Olave’s Hospi-
tal, in South London. The local CHC argued in the High
Court that there had been inadequate consultation,17 See: Philip Begley, Sally Sheard, and Eleanor Mackillop, eds. The 1974 NHS Reorganisation: The
Transcript of a Witness Seminar Held at the University of Liverpool in London on 9 November 2016 (Liverpool:
Department of Public Health and Policy, University of Liverpool, 2017), https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/
livacuk/instituteofpsychology/researchgroups/GoH,The,1974,NHS,Reorganisation.pdf, 6.
18 Begley, Sheard, and Mackillop, eds., 1974 NHS Reorganization (Ref. 17), 15.
19 Alex Mold, Making the Patient-Consumer: Patient Organisations and Health Consumerism in Britain
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 50.
20 Christine Hogg, Citizens, Consumers and the NHS: Capturing Voices (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), 22–23.
21 Hogg, Citizens (Ref. 20), 23.
22 National Health Service Reorganisation Act, 1973, c. 32, 10.
23 Mold, Making the Patient-Consumer (Ref. 19), 53.
www.sciencedirect.comwhereas commissioners testiﬁed that expenditure needed
urgent reduction, so the suspension was necessary.24
The closure of this hospital was contested in the House
of Commons, as well as in the courts, where the local
Member of Parliament credited the “magniﬁcent work”
of the CHC, and underscored the strength of local feeling
towards the hospital, “in the heart of my constituency,” as
well as emphasizing its long history as an old inﬁrmary.25
St Olave’s Hospital did not reopen, and indeed legal rul-
ings in the mid-1980s suggested that health authorities
ultimately had the power to close hospitals without con-
sultation in cases of ﬁnancial urgency.26 Nonetheless,
CHCs continued to contest hospital closures in the courts,
challenging the power of local authorities by using deﬁni-
tions of “consultation” constructed in state legislation.
CHCs were signiﬁcant in opening up health policy to
public voices in two key ways. First, the organizations
reﬂected and contributed to a growing assumption within
health policy work: that vulnerable public voices must be
considered in reforms. Alex Mold has argued that CHCs
tended to see themselves as guardians of community
interests, rather than direct or representative spokespeo-
ple.27 Of the voluntary sector board members, one in ten
worked for organizations concerned with mental health
and a quarter worked on behalf of elderly people.28 People
concerned with the interests of vulnerable groups were
thus formally brought in to conversation with long-stand-
ing actors in health reform. The second key way in which
CHCs were signiﬁcant was in terms of more broadly
disrupting assumptions about how health policy should
be formed, and who should be involved. Many CHCs
sought to challenge their vision of the NHS as a “closed
system . . . largely run for the beneﬁt of the doctors.”29
Through their existence and their actions, CHCs opened
up a space in which members of the public could—and
indeed felt like they should—seek to inﬂuence health
policy.
This space was ﬁlled by a broad variety of public action,
magniﬁed during the Governments of Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher from 1979, which sought to reduce
expenditure on the NHS, weaken trade unions, and enable
private contractors to take over NHS services including
cleaning and catering. In 1990, Thatcher’s government
introduced the internal market, whereby health authori-
ties and providers would purchase health care from hos-
pitals and health organisations, a “purchaser-provider
split.” Amidst these highly controversial changes, new
voluntary groups emerged from trade unions, pensioner
groups, local political parties, tenants’ associations, and
patient organizations, all seeking to thwart particular
local closures as well as national-level change. These
groups often expressed their views through strikes, occu-
pations, marches, lobbies, and petitions, rather than
through state-funded consultative exercises or CHCs.24 Melanie Phillips, “Hospital Closure ‘Hurried,’” Guardian, November 13, 1979, 4.
25 975 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1975) col. 1706.
26 Peter Hildrew, “Health Authority Wins Test Case on Hospital Closure,” Guardian, October 3, 1986, 3.
27 Mold, Making the Patient-Consumer (Ref. 19), 50.
28 Hogg, Citizens (Ref. 20), 23.
29 Christine Hogg (Secretary of a London CHC from 1974 to 1980, independent consultant for various CHCs,
the Association of CHCs for England and Wales, and the Society of CHC staff from 1984), cited in Mold, Making
the Patient-Consumer (Ref. 19), 55.
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1983 and initially funded by the Greater London Council,
also focused on compiling detailed reports about the state
of the NHS, drawing on ofﬁcial ﬁgures from Government
departments and providing information and analysis to
media and politicians.30 New patient groups provided
another type of subversive challenge: confronting biomed-
ical models of health by emphasizing the signiﬁcance of
social and psychological support, provided by peers as well
as clinicians. These groups also rejected narrow avenues
for reform, instead expressing their views through peer
meetings, intimate media interviews and literary
accounts. In addition to such collective action, individual
families launched legal challenges against hospital clo-
sures in the 1990s, which continued to rely on the argu-
ment that local authorities had not followed statutory
consultation procedures.31
Tensions around the meaning and limits of “consulta-
tion” continued throughout the late twentieth and early
twenty-ﬁrst centuries. The Health and Social Care Act of
2001, for example, reiterated a general duty of NHS
organizations to involve and consult people in planning
or changing health services. Yet this legislation did not
deﬁne the level at which the public must be involved,
which left space for further legal confrontation. Famously,
in 2006, a pensioner named Pam Smith successfully chal-
lenged the right of United Health Europe, a subsidiary of
the American healthcare provider United Health, to pro-
vide general practice services in her local area. Smith’s
concern was that private providers would seek to proﬁt out
from NHS services. Her legal claim, however, was based
on highlighting the low quality of public consultation
conducted before this decision was made.32
Thus, although public consultation became increasing-
ly relevant to NHS reform legislation beginning in the
1960s, public responses to reform were not narrowly con-
tained within state-organized consultative exercises. Par-
ticularly during fundamental changes to the structure of
the NHS in the reforms of 1974 and under Margaret
Thatcher, members of the public used a variety of means
to make their opinions heard. Many members of the public
deployed state-produced knowledge to challenge NHS re-
form, for example by providing new analyses based on
Department of Health statistics, or by using the consulta-
tive legislation to challenge health authorities in the
courts. The state-funded CHCs, also, often provided a
disruptive challenge to existing processes of negotiation
between national governments, local health authorities,
and organized medical interests, inspiring new actors to
contribute to health policy debate.
Progress?
It is tempting to trace a shift from 1945 through the early
twenty-ﬁrst century, during which NHS-related organiza-
tions were increasingly mandated to, and even became
more interested in, consulting with the public. The rela-30 See the London Health Emergency archival collections at the MRC.
31 “Health Authorities Rapped for Closing Bone Marrow Unit,” British Medical Journal 306, no. 6894 (1993):
1712.
32 Sarah Hall, “Pensioner Wins Court Battle to Stop US Healthcare Giant,” Guardian, August 24, 2006,
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2006/aug/24/health.politics.
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indeed shifted immensely over this period, most signiﬁ-
cantly perhaps in terms of relations between clinicians
and patients: the early 1960s model, wherein clinicians
would often tell patients little about their conditions, has
declined.33 However, in terms of public involvement in the
construction of policy, no linear, progressive narrative
dominates. Policymakers continually remade their visions
of patients in the NHS, ﬁrst in the 1960s and 1970s in
terms of rights and representation and later, under 1980s
and 1990s Conservative governments, around markets
and choice.34
Public consultation in the NHS shifted not only in line
with these broad visions of “the public,” but also in prag-
matic response to political contexts and perceptions of
previous consultative challenges. Thatcher’s governments
introduced the internal market to the NHS with minimal
consultation and despite bitter opposition from public and
medical professionals, who believed that making hospitals
self-governing would lead to privatization, and who ques-
tioned how the GP-patient relationship would be affected
by GPs becoming fund-holders.35 Health Minister Ken-
neth Clarke’s determined implementation of this reform
may be contrasted to the laborious consultative exercises
conducted by a previous Conservative government while
designing the Reorganization Act of 1973, who sought “to
achieve a consensus by consulting everyone and seeking to
satisfy all interests involved.”36 The contrast between how
these reforms were implemented demonstrates that the
will from political administrations for consultation has
retreated, as well as developed, over time. Political inter-
est in consultation shifts depending on a Government’s
power in the Commons (the 1989 Conservative govern-
ment was working from a much stronger majority than the
1973 one); the speciﬁc style and beliefs of each Health
Minister; and the current performance of the NHS, with
crises acting as a political justiﬁcation for urgent reform.
Individual and institutional memories of previous consul-
tative efforts are also important: in the 1989 case, many
politicians believed that the consultative work of the
1973 reform had created an overly complex and unwork-
able system.37
Although the practice, efﬁcacy, and meaningfulness of
consultation have not necessarily increased over time, the
usage of the term has. It is a broad term, with varying
deﬁnitions imposed by patients, publics, and policymakers
over time and space. Looking back to the inception of the
NHS can further our understanding. Taking a longer
historical view suggests that various public groups have
felt increasingly empowered to assert their “rights” to
inﬂuence health care reform, in a variety of ways. At
the same time, demanding change has required that these
groups commit serious of ﬁnancial, temporal, and emo-
tional resources to their cases, often at times when they33 Mold, Making the Patient-Consumer (Ref. 19).
34 Mold, Making the Patient-Consumer (Ref. 19).
35 Timmins, Never Again? (Ref. 1), 14–15.
36 Rudolf Klein and Bill New, Two Cheers?: Reﬂections on the Health of NHS Democracy (London: King’s
Fund, 1998), 9.
37 Klein and New, Two Cheers? (Ref. 36), 9.
41 Martin Gorsky and Virginia Preston, eds., Tomlinson Report and After: Reshaping London’s Health
14 Endeavour Vol. 42 No. 1themselves have faced signiﬁcant health-related chal-
lenges.
Voluntary organizations have acted as mediators, am-
plifying individual voices. The press, the Socialist Medical
Association, and various trade unions and campaign
groups have, since the start of the NHS and before, shaped
the ways in which the public have called for NHS reform,
enabling certain people to inﬂuence reform whether
through ﬁlling out surveys or by becoming spokespeople
themselves. Community Health Councils and their later
equivalents—Public and Patient Involvement Forums and
local involvement networks—were state-funded efforts to
manage this consultative process, but these fora also at
times sharply challenged national governments and local
health authorities. While intending to provide new spaces
for patient voices, these groups also again required publics
to develop a level of understandings of their internal
systems and regulatory roles. Thus, history shows that
everyday spaces of encounter have shaped the multiple
relationships between policy and publics. These broad
groups have engaged with one another not only during
consultative exercises, but at the ballot box, through the
informing and reading of opinion polls, and within the
mediatory work of small but signiﬁcant voluntary groups.
Improving Involvement
The interface between publics and policymakers has thus
not developed in a progressive manner, but rather has
been recreated and reinscribed over time on local, region-
al, and national levels, and through various points of legal,
medical, and political encounter. Public attempts to in-
form NHS debate have at times progressed separately
from political efforts to track public opinion, with great
frustration on both sides. One key barrier to change has
been suspicion from politicians about the utility of consul-
tative efforts, driven by a constant fear that public affec-
tion for the NHS will act as a barrier to improvement.38
This notion is visible, for example, in a newsletter of the
Conservative Medical Society from the 1988, suggesting
that the NHS’s “popularity” must not “obscure the need to
ﬁnd solutions to its genuine problems.”39 Tony Blair,
reporting to the House of Commons Liaison Committee
in 2006, similarly positioned public feeling as a barrier to
change. Blair stated that even if clinicians advised that
hospital provision should be centralized, local people
would still protest. Suggesting that other politicians
shared his attitude, Blair emphasized that “everybody
who has ever dealt with a potential hospital closure” knew
this “problem.”40
Policymakers have been particularly dismissive of cam-
paigning, rallies, and marches—the popular spaces
through which members of the public have sought to
challenge or inﬂuence reform. In one retrospective witness
seminar, senior civil servants and public inquiry members
described campaigning as “downright insulting” and “ta-
ble banging,” positioning such efforts as in conﬂict with38 Point made verbally in discussions by Professor Roberta Bivins, University of Warwick.
39 “NHS: Fortieth Anniversary, the NHS Background,” August 1988, Conservative Medical Society Bulletin,
Issue No. 11, 1, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archives.
40 House of Commons Liaison Committee, The Prime Minister, Oral and Written Evidence, Tuesday
February 7, 2006, Tony Blair, 45.
www.sciencedirect.com“the greater good.”41 But not all political ﬁgures have
shared this attitude. Prominent Labour Party Members
of Parliament, including the party’s current leader, Jer-
emy Corbyn, attended and spoke at rallies against NHS
cuts and closures in the 1980s.42 Throughout the late
twentieth century, individual campaigners, campaign
groups, and patient representatives established produc-
tive working relationships with individual Members of
Parliament from all political parties.
Despite these positive encounters, however, much evi-
dence remains that campaigners and publics have felt
frustrated by NHS consultative practice. In 1983, one
campaigner wrote to the Politics of Health Group that
activists regularly encountered the same “slippery-ton-
gued, public-school NHS yes-man.”43 Those creating peti-
tions, such as Janet, who collected 180,000 signatures in
2002 against a local hospital closure, nonetheless often feel
that “in the corridors of power, barely an eyelid was
batted.”44 Despite the disillusion in these testimonies,
however, and the suspicion of media and political inter-
ests, the individuals involved were still willing to try to
shape NHS reform, attending campaign meetings and
writing to national newspapers to express their views.
Poor quality consultative encounters have made members
of the public cynical, but it is not necessarily too late to re-
engage them in a productive and new ways.
To do so, policymakers must recognize that “the public”
are not an uncomplicated nor a homogenous mass, who
will automatically, and without reﬂection, object to any
type of NHS reform. Historically, public views around the
NHS have long been complex and varied. This was the case
at the inception of the NHS when—as we have seen—some
members of the public were simply disinterested, whereas
others were passionate advocates for the new service,
interested in reading, interpreting, and contributing to
relevant policy documents. Since 1945, members of the
public have sought to engage with NHS policy in a variety
of ways. Underlying overall strong support from the NHS,
publics have had a range of experiences of different ele-
ments of primary, secondary, and community care func-
tioning across various locales.
In this context, policymakers should also recognize that
members of the public hold valuable expertise in terms of,
for example, advising on how equal access to healthcare
can be promoted, and in explaining why public health and
prevention initiatives may not always be taken up effec-
tively. Members of the public have developed this exper-
tise through voluntary and paid work, and as patients,
friends, members of families and communities, who have
come in to contact with the service on multiple occasions
over their lifetimes. Accessing these public views is worth-
while, but requires meaningful, careful, and accessible
engagement with a range of public groups, and the pay-
ment of careful attention to the cultural and social con-
texts within which healthcare operates. PolicymakersServices 1992–1997, Transcript of a Witness Seminar, November 13, 2012, 27–29, 41.
42 “Barking Strike: Spread the Action,” Health Emergency, June 1984, 7; “Rain On Our Parade,” Health
Emergency, July–August 1984, 2; “Barking: The Fight Goes On!,” Health Emergency, August 1985, 7.
43 Politics of Health Group, Politics of Health 6: February 1983, Letters, 14, Wellcome Library, SA/PHG/2/1-
7.
44 Janet, “Are You Listening to Us, Tony Blair?,” Daily Mail, April 18, 2002, 63.
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around hospital closures. Yet such campaigns reﬂect pub-
lic investment and belief in the principles and potential of
the NHS. Anti-closure campaigns often also reﬂect valid
concerns about whether particular sites are the only
spaces in which certain communities can access health-
care. Such campaigns are signiﬁcant, and historically
relatively frequent: they must be addressed and engaged
with, not ignored.
Conclusion
Current debates among policymakers and think-tanks
about public consultation are too present-focused, with
public involvement in NHS decision-making constructed
as “new,” or dating back only as far as the 1990s. By
thinking about consultation in its longer historical con-
texts, two points become clear. First, thinking about con-
sultation as “new” is potentially a means through which to
devalue it; to construct it as an unnecessary, inappropri-
ate, transient, or faddish part of NHS practice. However,
looking to history belies this interpretation. Consultation
has in fact been part of the theory and practice of postwar
health policy since the inception of the NHS. A second
issue which becomes clear, in looking to history, is that
ofﬁcial consultative mechanisms have never been able to
slake the public thirst for engagement. This does not
necessarily mean that state-run consultative processes
have always been ill-conceived. Rather, formal mecha-
nisms will never provide the only source of public input.
Indeed, there are—and have been from its inception—a
broad array of publics interested in NHS reform, including
people conceptualizing themselves as patients, family
members, citizens, and members of communities, and
acting individually or through voluntary organizations.
Accordingly, public attempts to participate in shaping
reform have included participation in consultative proce-
dures, marches, rallies, petitions, and the formation of
campaign groups, as well as electoral behavior.
Policymakers have likewise used a range of consulta-
tive mechanisms, encompassing hospital services, prima-
ry care settings, and community services, administered
over time by an array of different management structures
organized by local and national authorities. Although this
article focused on England, the NHS itself has also com-
prised, throughout the late twentieth century, the four
health systems managed separately for England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland, each accountable to dif-
ferent national politicians and departments. Seeking to
justify, progress, or advise their reforms, the NHS and
successive Governments have variously: informed the
public about change; sought out feedback on predeter-
mined decisions; worked with community members over
time to ensure that their concerns are addressed before
reform; and devolved decisions into the hands of individu-
als.45
Given the variety and depth of public opinion and
feeling about the NHS, health authorities should take a
broad approach to consultation. Even though policy-45 See for reference how NHS England uses the “Ladder of Engagement and Participation,” based on the
work of Sherry Arnstein, NHS England, “Patient and Public Participation Policy,” https://www.england.nhs.uk/
publication/patient-and-public-participation-policy/, 14.
www.sciencedirect.commakers have engaged through a range of institutions,
and have also increasingly discussed the signiﬁcance of
consultation since the 1970s, many members of the public
have felt—and continue to feel—deeply concerned about
the future of the NHS. Consultative bodies have increas-
ingly listened to public voices, but politicians have not
always shaped policy accordingly. In part, this reﬂects the
challenges for democratic government in terms of under-
standing and representing varied public interests. At the
same time, politicians have historically also expressed
deeply held suspicions of consultative processes in relation
to the NHS. Policymakers have stated that these may
create overly complex and confused systems, and that
public affection for the NHS may be a barrier to reform,
rather than a beneﬁt. These attitudes, as well as funda-
mental power imbalances between publics and policy-
makers, have shaped and tainted consultative
encounters. Memories of cases when consultative process-
es were ignored, absent, or ineffective have been passed
down between families, communities, and campaign
groups, and are magniﬁed through media analysis.
Even though policymakers and publics have had differ-
ing opinions about the service, both groups have empha-
sized a cultural vision of the service as “our NHS,”
belonging to, and meaningful to, everyone. The vision of
the service as a national one, belonging to “the people,”
reﬂects and shapes public interest in NHS reform, and has
created the expectation that policymakers will and should
consult as broadly as possible. Public interest in the NHS
is long standing, and is not going away. Poor quality
consultative procedures, or the absence of such work, will
contribute to public distrust in politicians, as well as
leading to legal challenges and public and professional
outcry.
In this context, and as heated debate continues about
NHS reforms and funding, policymakers should engage
members of the public far more effectively, recognizing the
wealth of expertise and experiences held by patients,
community groups, and NHS workers who use, volunteer
for, run, donate to, and indeed love the service every day.
Engaging effectively with these groups is time-consuming,
and requires long-standing and regular points of contact
with multiple groups, enabling a diverse range of individ-
uals to contribute to debate in appropriate and accessible
ways. Nonetheless, such consultation may also provide a
useful model for best practice in responding to public
preferences and demands, and in terms of understanding
how to deploy and utilize public affection and enthusiasm
to the beneﬁt of national systems.
Consultative practice will not evolve quickly or uni-
formly, but history also shows that individual politicians
and health authorities can themselves make a difference
by critically assessing and reshaping their consultative
procedures on a local level, and by engaging the public as
partners in promoting good health. These policymakers
can also fund, support and listen to broad range of volun-
tary and mediatory groups, established to consult with,
represent, and empower a diverse range of communities.
Such varied voluntary organizations—patient groups,
campaigners, community groups, staff groups—have al-
ways had, and continue to play, a key role in analyzing,
16 Endeavour Vol. 42 No. 1bringing to light, challenging and contributing to the
formation of NHS policy and practice today.
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